RTS Papers / Genesis to Joshua / Fall 2017
An Exegetical Paper on the General Equity Principle
What is the meaning of this law to the original audience?
Given that this law is addressed in several places of the Pentateuch, principally in the ninth commandment, it would seem that the Israelites under Moses would have viewed this as a broad category similar to the other commandments of the second table of the Decalogue. The significance of this law being repeated in Deuteronomy is, in one sense, no different than the same for any of the other laws. Keil & Delitzsch give us a sort of mission statement of the whole law: “To secure life and property against false accusations” [938].
In getting to the heart of what this law would have meant to its original audience, we need to go deeper than the surface elements and ask: What is the essential object that has been violated? What is the nature of that violation? What is the desired end that goes by the name “restoration”? Answering these will go a long way toward showing how this judicial law is a manifestation of the general equity principle in the moral law.
First, what is the object that has been violated but the image of God? False witness is never a victimless crime. The command basically addresses a violence against other images of God. Childs points out the commonality of these laws with others in the ANE, and that one’s neighbor was “the full citizen within the covenantal community” [424].
Concisely stated, false witness murders and steals; or, to say it another way, to break the ninth commandment is to violate the spirit, if not also the letter, of the sixth and eighth commandments as well. Why is this the case? It is because the image of God has a very holistic stewardship from God: a matrix of covenant agreements, involving other people, plans, property, productivity, and even his own speech (which is really just intellectual property).
A false witness sends a shockwave of theft and murder and dishonor through the fabric of that total stewardship. It defaces the image, and cripples a portion of his capacities to glorify God. As one example, if a worker is lied about, he may expect less pay or less chance of a promotion, though he may be harder working and more qualified than others who will now move ahead.
Second, the exact nature of this violation called “false witness” follows from the first point. The word “spread,” of these false reports, which could be rendered “lift up” (Ex. 23:1), is meant to contain baseless charges from disseminating abroad. Even charges that wind up being true should not be discussed outside of appropriate circles. Gispen adds that “The Israelite may not give a ‘witness of falsehood,’” which includes “the whole spectrum of sins of the tongue: gossip, slander, flattery, etc.” [198]. However we must agree with Childs that, “The original commandment is, therefore, not a general prohibition of lying, but forbids lying which directly affects one’s fellow” [424].
Of the Exodus 23 passage, Cole suggests that a “malicious witness” is “better translated ‘witness in a charge of violence,’ for the thought is that a verdict will be fatal to the defendant” [184]. Consequently the overarching idea is that false witness is deliberate violence against God’s image (cf. Jam. 3:9), always causing measurable damage.
The two false witnesses ordered by Jezebel murdered Naboth and stole his vineyard for Ahab (cf. 1 Ki. 21:10-13); and the Psalmist cries out, “Give me not up to the will of my adversaries; for false witnesses have risen against me, and they breathe out violence” (Ps. 27:12). Childs suggests that a passage from Hosea evidences a broader interpretation of such commands by the time of the prophets: “there is swearing, lying, murder, stealing, and committing adultery; they break all bounds, and bloodshed follows bloodshed” (Hos. 4:2) [425]. Lying about someone out of court could get someone in court to begin with.
Finally, what is the end, or aim, of this law? In retributive justice the violator is taught the value of that which he has violated — both the person and the property (including that intellectual property of the man’s words). Compensation may have included such things as the materials for offerings: e. g. grain, bulls, etc. The implication seems to be that if a thief must restore the exact quantity of good stolen (plus some amount of interest), the false witness must at least restore the exact amount of truth that has been twisted. He must go to all who heard and explain that what he said is not true. However much the victim may “not be innocent” in other affairs, or in other respects, he is at least innocent of the particular false charge in view.
Significant literary, historical, or theological issues related to this law
For the present thesis, the most important issue, that is at once literary, historical, and theological, is this: How do these laws outside of the Decalogue “manifest” moral law? A distinction is made by Currid between the moral laws of the Decalogue and the מִּשְׁפָּטִים that begin at 21:1. This division may appear to separate the moral law from those laws given only within the context of Old Testament Israel.
Currid states that “the laws of the Book of the Covenant deal with the specific social and economic contexts of the people of Israel” [84]. In fairness to Currid, it would seem that all he means is that these Mosaic rules do not apply to other civil governments in terms of their exact audiences, circumstances, and punishments. Poythress holds to the same distinction, but adds that “this distinction is often a matter of degree” [101]. His example is helpful. It is the Fifth Commandment’s promise that “You will live long in the land.”
The repetition in Deuteronomy makes it plain who, primarily, will live long in the land. It is addressing Israel in the Promised Land. In other words, the cultural context of Old Testament Israel “intrudes” into the Ten Commandments as well. The moment we qualify this promise in the Fifth Commandment as addressing Israel in one sense and other people groups in another sense—the moment this distinction is made, we have abandoned the absolute division between the morality of the Decalogue and the spirit of the מִּשְׁפָּטִים. And of course Paul applies this very promise to Christian parents in the new covenant age (cf. Eph. 6:2-3).
Redd sees Deuteronomy 25:1-19 pertaining to the ninth commandment, given his wider framework of “stipulations” (4:44-26:19) [138]. The implication of this view is that such injustices as impoverished widows and crooked business practices were both instances of dishonesty. Woods explains the link between false witness and leprosy in Deuteronomy 24:8 by appealing to the punishment against Miriam for bearing false witness against Moses (cf. Num. 12:1) [252].
What such relationships begin to show is that the context for specific laws on false witness is the way in which a true witness is designed to uphold the integrity of the rest of the law.
All of the commandments are connected in many ways; but the role of the witness—and true speech in general—is unique in that such a concern for truth is precisely how one discerns innocence and guilt in the rest.
The way that general equity comes into play with false witness can be seen in one element of the law that seems to be retained in the New Testament: two or three witnesses. Is the law of Moses indeed saying that “all” that is required is two witnesses? What if another witness arises that contradicts their testimony? Then it is two against one. Case closed? Two wins? Is this really the spirit of the law? There is indication in extra-biblical Jewish writings that two witnesses can be false and judged by God on the spot [Daube, 4-5]. This tells us that the spirit of the law is not primarily about the exact number of witnesses, but about the care given to finding out the truth. More witnesses amounts to more accountability.
The application of the lex talionis to false witness is another example of general equity. Keil & Delitzsch report that “the same law existed in Egypt with reference to false accusers” [938]. Ridderbos says the same about the Code of Hammurabi [213]. In other words, that false witnesses deserved to have come upon them what they intended for their victim (Deut. 19:19) is something written on the heart of even the Gentiles (cf. Rom. 2:14-15). That false witness belongs to moral law, and thus natural law, is only to say that false witness has an objective nature or shape. This “shape” to false witness abides throughout all human societies. Scripture presents it as such.
We may say it like this: false witness destroys a society. We see this in Psalm 27:12 and Proverbs 6:19, 12:17, 19, 14:5, 19:5, 9, and 25:18. In these passages, false witness is organized around a principle of violence. It is divisive and deceptive. The perpetrator may last for a mere moment, but the destruction unleashed is incalculable (cf. Jam. 3:5-6). These things are true about false witness across the board. It is not merely “Israel-shaped,” though God’s special people certainly have been given a higher standard of truth and for the greatest possible purposes in Christ. However the basic evil in false witness will have the same effects among all people groups.
(#falsewitness #lying #slander #defamation #truth #Mosaic)
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