RTS Papers / Summer 2017
Substance and Signs in the Sentences of Peter Lombard
THE RATIONAL NATURE OVER ALL CREATION
1. The cause and mode of creation (d.1)
There is only one principle (beginning) of all things, namely, God. Plato posited three — God, archetype, and matter — with God being only craftsman; Aristotle also three — form, matter, and efficiency. But to create is to make out of nothing, and that by his eternal will and word. “Not that something new is happening in him, but that something new is made as it had been in his eternal will, without any motion or change on his part” [II.4]. This is the first significance of things outside of God. It is that they have none apart from him. They were all nothing apart from God’s purposes. They could be a sign of nothing else. But the other importance in this idea is the distinction between God's immutable inner life (ad intra) and all that which he changes outside of him (ad extra).
Aside from the cause of creation, there is the distinction of works on the six days—heaven signifies the realm of angels and earth of the four elements. Augustine taught that the whole of the creation “days” was, in reality, a simultaneous and singular work; Gregory, Jerome, Bede, and others, favored that there was an original chaos and the six days filled in the corporeal works sequentially. Darkness signifies absence, though it is used in different senses. Matter was at first formless, or lacking in the order and beauty it finally received [II.52]. Day is used diversely in Scripture. Night to morning computation as “day” meant as an allegory of passing from darkness to light in redemption [II.56]. That “God said” is an act not in time, nor by sound, but by the eternal Word. The sun, moon, and stars were specifically given for signs, so some might think that there was no time before this. But these are signs of keeping time and not time itself. The reason given is very pragmatic. Nothing about idolatry.
The manner of paradise is also important to Peter’s understanding of creation. Was it wholly corporeal, wholly spiritual, or both corporeal and spiritual? Lombard favored the third (d.17). But it is the two trees that give Paradise’s signs. One is called the tree of life “because it was divinely given the power that, if one ate of its fruit, one’s body would be strengthened in constant health and perpetual firmness, and it would not fall, by any illness or infirmity of age, into debility or death.” The other is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil “because after God’s prohibition, a transgression would be done regarding it by which man would learn from his experience the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience” [II.75].
Even in the Reformed tradition these have sometimes been considered something like “sacraments” of the covenant of works. Here in the Sentences that which is signified by these two trees is not very different. One deals with the reward and the other with the condition of man’s original relationship to God.
Then there is the difference between ordinary providence and miracles. Something can be made either primordially or else naturally, or even primordially and naturally, as the multiplied bread was a miracle worked from existing loaves. Miracles more clearly signify grace, while providence works more ordinarily through nature. Both have God as their efficient cause. But whereas providence works from the “seminal reasons” [II.79]. God places in things, like fruit from a seed, in a miracle, the supernatural is more clearly signified. This also ties into the Sabbath as a sign (d.15).
How is it that God rested from all his works when Jesus says that the Father and he are still working and the author of Hebrews that he now upholds all things? (Jn. 5:17, Heb. 1:3) His answer: it means a ceasing, namely, of those works. He did not make any new thing. That the day was blessed and sanctified for man makes it part of the moral law. So the works from which God ceased belonged to the primordial and immediate creative work of God, whereas there is also the ongoing work of providence working concurrently with nature. That this was the ground for the fourth commandment makes God’s rest a sign for our rest.
2. Of the angels (d.2)
Four attributes of the angels, at their origin, may be distinguished: indivisibility, personality, rationality, and free choice. Three of these belong to humans as well. Lombard says that God created the angels neither perfect and blessed, nor sinful and miserable, hinging it upon whether they knew their destiny. Only God is perfect in the universal sense. Angels at the beginning were made perfect according to time, but not according “to nature,” that is, not possessing the perfection of such a being in the end (d.4). But these beings are messengers, often representing God in some kind of an appearance. Their very presence at these moments in the Bible forms a sign of God’s presence and speech.
Angels had bodily form, which is to say that God made use of their bodily form, whether they have their own or were created at the point of their sending. The demons possess a man not by entering his soul, but by enticing him and filling him with his own wickedness. So they do not enter a man substantially, but through the effects of sin (d.8). At first glance it seems utterly speculative when he says that each soul has a good angel to watch over it and an evil one to train it. But then he brings in Matthew 18:10 to suggest angels assigned to little ones. The Apostle Peter too spoke of angels watching over him in Acts 12:11 and 15. And then we might think of Paul’s statement about the thorn in his flesh (2 Cor. 12:7).
3. What is meant by the image of God? (d.16)
Eve’s soul was not made from Adam’s, but all souls are created the same (d.18). So why would God have us see that she was taken from him bodily, but another sign? Why was she taken from the side? The answer seems very balanced for his time. If from the head, she might have dominated; if from the feet she would have been servile. From the side, she is made to be a partner, neither above nor underneath. The sacraments are also prefigured in this: “so the Church was formed from the sacraments which flowed from the side of Christ, namely blood and water” [II.77].
When the image of God is exercising dominion, there is an analogy to God’s creative priority over the creation. The mind of man is seen to be the most excellent part of him, and so he first subordinates the lower part of his nature to reason. When man places reason over material, he is acting more like the image-bearer — and less like a mere animal — precisely because he is acting more like God. This idea is what draws so much of the “Gnostic” charge in certain circles today. It is thought that this devalues the body. However if the body derives its significance from a higher reason, then this body will be more significant in the world than that of one of the lower beasts.
The rational creature alone — the incorporeal and corporeal — may share in God’s blessing by enjoying him. The body-soul union made analogous to any rational creature’s approach to God. Given this supremacy of reason, why should man be in any sense more exalted than the angels? Peter’s theory is that because man serves God bodily in this life, with its weaknesses, he might deserve the greater crown.
Genesis shows man being formed in a way that shows the hierarchy: the clay of earth and breath of God correspond to the lower bodily and higher spiritual dimensions of man. 1 Corinthians 15 makes an allusion to this in comparing the “man of dust” with the “man of heaven.” But the comparison is not between “animal man” and “spiritual man,” but rather “natural man” and “spiritual man.” Peter is not talking about anything like evolution, or even anything overtly Aristotelian, in speaking of man as something like “animal-plus-reason.” Man exists on an altogether higher plane. Human good is two-fold according to his nature: the first animal and the second spiritual. Now he is ordering them by which comes first in our experience, as one graduates from one to the other. Distinction 24 is where he most clearly deals with the so-called “faculties” of man.
Sensuality is that lower portion of the soul directed by the appetites. Reason is the higher portion of the soul, itself divided between a superior, which contemplates eternal things, and an inferior, which looks after the temporal [II.109].
There is also the moral nature of man. Prior to the fall this meant the ability to die or not to die (d.19, 24). Man prior to sin was made a living soul, “mortal and immortal with respect to the body,” that is “the power to die or not to die” [II.82]. And it was from the tree of life, and not nature, that Adam had the power not to die. Some suggest the tree of life was the antithesis to the other tree, so that it was not merely by eating what was forbidden but by not eating what was commended. But if this tree contained this power, then here we have a sign that is more than a sign but also a real thing.
Now once we grasp man in his metaphysical nature and his moral nature (not that those two can be isolated from each other), we can see what this makeup of man is for. We will remember that the rational soul in not meant to merely look at signs and follow them, as if a puzzle, to their substance. But his whole heart was meant to move through uses to ultimate enjoyment, namely to God. With this in mind, Peter says that man was made with a threefold knowledge: 1. of things made for his sake, 2. of God, and 3. of himself. The first is known to rule over, the second to worship, and the third to know how to proceed (d.23).
4. The origin of sin
The form of the serpent was chosen by God (d.21). The devil instituted deception by a question, yet removed the true evil and doubled the false promise. Two kinds of temptations are introduced: one external and the other internal: the former is some word, or sign, enticing us toward it, the latter enticing by means of error or sin already in us. So there is always a twofold temptation. The external object of enticement is not the substance of it. A man who sees a stack of money is not enticed because it is paper, but for the end of what he can do with it. But knowing that this money is not his, so the end for which the money is taken is not his either. This implies that neither the money, nor the thing purchased, were the substance of temptation but only the sign. Covetousness is at work. There is an inordinate desire to have what has not been given by God.
What is the primal sin? pride, unbelief, lust? (d.22) it was Augustine who suggested pride. In particular, unbelief had to exist in Adam and Eve in order to be successfully tempted; and yet the devil’s persuasion came through Eve to Adam. Lombard appears to make too much of whether pride was unique to the root of the devil’s sin versus the first couple.
Is there a greater guilt in either the man or the woman? Eve is said to have believed the devil’s lie directly while Adam only believed the sin in a venial manner. By this some infer that the woman had the greater sin. Isidore countered that since there is a three-fold spectrum of guilt attached to sin, whether by intent, infirmity, or ignorance, that Eve sinned in ignorance while Adam did not. Also there is a three-fold ignorance: those who do not wish to know, though they are able, those who wish to know but cannot, and those who simply do not know. Interestingly this order of guilt in the Genesis account becomes a sign for the causes in us of either venial or mortal sin (d.24). When the lower principle eats of the fruit it is only venial sin, yet when the higher principle more actively suppresses truth and eats, it is mortal. Eve knew enough to be guilty, Adam knew better, and the fallen angel knew best. Thus the guilt and punishment is weighted toward the higher reason.
At this point a critique of the Augustinian-Lombard doctrine of sex is unavoidable. Having already alluded to lust as basic to the sin nature, he asks the question: Would there have been procreation had Adam never fallen? (d.20) Some authorities denied the possibility of intercourse because they view it as inherently sinful. Some also affirmed a marriage bed “without stain,” but only by restricting its purpose to procreation, treating all bodily pleasure as lust. At some point, parents would have been “transferred to better things” [II.88], once children were grown. More will be said about this when we arrive at the place of marriage in the sacraments. However it is important to notice how lust plays a role in doctrine of sin in general and the origin of the sinless human Jesus in particular. Even a faulty doctrine can teach us about doctrinal ordering, as the way that Lombard conceives of sex determines how he sees the conception of sin.
5. The nature of sin
What is sin? It is disobedience and any transgression of the law of God. Sin is also deprivation of being, and yet the evil will is doing something. But how can sin corrupt the good if it is nothing? The answer is that it is the corruption. Being drawn into the power of the devil, the sinner is further deprived of his natural goods, and this distances man further from his true makeup [II.179]. In this progression of sinning, the soul is further from God, not by place, but in likeness, since we become what we behold. So we must add to our definition of sin something like distortion of the soul. There is also a judicial element to sin’s progress. Some sins are both sin and the punishment for sin (d.36). At this point he must anticipate an objection. All punishment of sin is just. But here it would appear that God is pouring on more sin instead of judgment. Augustine replied, “yet it is not the sin that is God’s, but the judgment” [II.182; Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, c10 n19]. And he appeals to Romans 1, where three times God handed them over to the further debasement of their souls through further sin.
Answering the objection that evil actions are in no way from God, and that in no way are they good. This is from an extreme misunderstanding of Augustine in those who deduce that since “All that is, insofar as it is, is good.” Consequently sin is nothing and sinners become nothing, therefore the whole train is not from being. Isaiah 5:20 is cited by them to restrict the same thing being called “good” which is called “evil.” But there is an equivocation over the referent thing. Also God cannot be the “author of nothing,” but God is the author of punishment, which is something; and since all subsequent sins after the original were judicial, it follows that God can author a thing in his sentence, which the matter of sin is committed by free will.
Why did God create man knowing he would sin and what was the origin of this sin? While asserting “free will” at this point does not satisfactorily answer, Augustine points to something deep of the will in saying, “It is more glorious not to consent than to be unable to be tempted” [II.104; Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, bk 11 c4 n6]. Peter does not delve into the mechanics of this origin, though he does make use of Augustine’s reasoning. The cause of the first evil had to be a good thing in itself, as good is superior in being. Yet an evil will must be the secondary cause of evil.
Augustine says it like this: “the cause of evil things is the falling away from the unchangeable good of the will of a changeable good, first of the angel and then of man … This is the first evil of the rational creature, namely the first privation of good” [II.171; Augustine, Enchiridion, cc23-24].
In a sense man is an “evil good,” since man is a nature and each nature is good per se. “And so each nature, even if it is defective, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is defective, it is evil” [II.173]. Overall he is content to turn the discussion over to the end and rational activity of man.
6. Free will, grace, and virtue
Operating grace prepares the will of man to will the good. It is the efficient cause of the good will. Cooperating grace comes to its aid and helps it not to will in vain (d.26). After the fall, ‘cooperating grace’ was added by which those who converted might love God. Operating grace justifies, making the evil one good; cooperative grace sanctifies and perseveres, making better virtue. But the rewards of blessedness precede the merit (d.5).
Augustine said, “virtue is a good quality of the mind by which we live righteously and of which no one makes an evil use; God alone works virtue in man” [II.132; Augustine, Retractationes, bk 1 c9 n4]. Many object that if a good will is not from free choice, then there can be no virtue. “When he crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than his own gifts” [II.135; Augustine, Epistola 194, c5 n19]. This too belongs to Lombard’s application of signs to things. The “crowns” are signs of a grace that works. Virtue is the good use of free choice.
The will is known by its end, being either righteous or depraved. All commandments to the will are directed to love (or charity). God is love and so this is not a different chief end. So the acts of love, in particular, as in the second greatest commandment, are signs of that chief end of loving the triune God. In the same way also the ends of doing things for “the sake of the gospel” or “for the sake of the kingdom” are also not disparate ends. Is there a difference between ‘will’ and ‘end,’ especially when ‘intention’ is often taken to mean both? The end is that pleasure—whether good or evil—sought by the soul as its good. The “intention looks to that for the sake of which we will, and the will to that which we will” [II.194]. This will come back up in Book III in the section on faith, hope, and love. Wisdom requires that we understand the difference between a truly righteous act and a mere change in circumstances. An individual with greater resources in the world will be able to move more external circumstances, and yet his virtue is not necessarily greater. The widow’s mite teaches us that.
Actions, like the will, are to be judged by their ends (d.40, 41, 42). Augustine said, “Do not pay attention so much to what a man does, but to what he has in view as he does it” [II.198; Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, exp. 2 on Ps. 31, n4]. This might seem like relativism at first glance. Perhaps it is a kind of situational ethics, we might think. In reality he views the moral worth of actions in light of their substance and not their shadows. He also sees some sins as “sins in themselves,” such as lying, thefts, rapes, blasphemies, etc. Nonetheless the essence of virtue and vice is the basic leaning of the heart. As a clue to his nuance, one who steals out of covetousness is worse than one who steals out of compassion. The point is not that the stealing ever turns out to be right, but rather there are varying degrees of guilt.
There are varying capacities of the conscience. “Whatever is not done out of faith is sin” (Rom. 14:23). As was said already, “the intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention” [II.202]. What follows is no good intention apart from faith. So the same external actions can be good from faith and evil without faith. This also follows what was said about the end of love. A good action can be good in itself, and all the while, a soul in that same act can be totally displeasing to God. It also follows that the degree of guilt for sin rises with the level of intelligent volition in the act: i. e. intent. A woman may feed a child, but we may discover that she is doing it for publicity or out of self-pity. She may even exact guilt or applause from others for it. Peter returns to this rationale at the aforementioned end of Book III. It may have been preferable if he had written a fifth volume on the law and Christian life and put these two sections together.
The upshot is that the real essence of sin is the wicked intent. To make the same point another way, a teenager may desire to act to the utmost on his lust, but lack all of the relational and monetary advantages in carrying it out. He is not for that reason pure. This may seem to present a dilemma. Are we to conclude from the Sermon on the Mount, for example, that adultery and murder of the heart — which are otherwise called “lust” and “hatred” — are worse than the physical acts carried out? No. But the very decision to carry it out or else to restrain it shows that the seat of the heinous sin is still in the heart and not in the hands.
Is an evil will in an evil man one sin or several? Someone who willingly steals commits theft both as an act and in his heart. Some object that this is one sin in a greater or lesser form. His answer: How then can one who conceived to do an evil avoid carrying it out? If these are not two separate evils, then there would be no virtue in restraining the thought from being acted out in the world. For example, the difference between the tenth and the eight commandments also show this distinction. To covet someone else’s things is to wish they were yours, but to steal them is to secure the wish. How are these two commandments and not one? They may seem to be the same substance, and yet moving from our hearts to our hands they are really two distinct things, however much the theft may be a sign of our envy or our discontentment with our lot from God.
7. Augustinianism over Pelagianism
Was the first sin original or actual? Pelagians say that the first sin was transmitted not by propagation but by imitation. Thus all are said to be born innocent. But original sin is a fault and it passes on both its nature and its penalty. The vice of concupiscence is the essence of the nature. So to the first question, that which was passed on was original sin (cf. Rom. 5:12) but that which was first committed was actual sin (cf. Rom. 5:18).
Does original sin pass from fathers to sons spiritually or bodily? (d.31, 33) Augustine thinks it is through the flesh. It is lust and so the sin must happen in the soul. Yet because the soul comes into contact with such corrupt flesh — this is where the nature of sin comes from every time. This theory is very Gnostic, especially about sex, but it has the advantage of explaining every case of a new human being sinful. But Ambrose went as far to say that sin does not live in the spirit but in the flesh: seeming to use “spirit” as a synonym for soul. “But the soul is not transmitted, and so it does not have the cause of sin in it” [II.155; Ambrosiaster, On Rom. 7, 18]. Another advantage a Catholic would cite is that the Virgin Birth lacked this fault and thus Jesus could be born apart from original sin [II.157]. It is not clear how this is not an exercise in moving the problem back a step. How was Mary’s nature kept from sin? What about the lust of her parents that conceived her? And if she avoided it in some other way, why could God not have found another way to preserve the sinless nature of Jesus?
On the doctrine that original sin is remitted in baptism (d.32). The dominion of concupiscence diminished after baptism, which has a double-effect: the attenuation of its power and the absolution from its guilt. The law of sin is not washed away entirely in baptism except, perhaps, by some ineffable grace of God. This grace of baptism is simultaneous with regeneration. It cleanses not only the soul but the flesh — otherwise each generation would get worse by the accumulating pollution. The problems associated with this will be treated in the section on sacraments.
(#Peter #Lombard #Sentences #image #signs #concupiscence #originalsin)
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