RTS Papers / Advanced Exegesis / Spring 2019
INTEGRATION: A STUDY OF THEOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS
Since Muller began his “path” to contemporary formulation with biblical studies, where does he stand on the question of the text’s meaning? He says that the purpose of historical-exegetical studies is “to place us as readers of the text into the milieu of the authors” [576]. Are we to conclude from this something along the lines of Walter Kaiser’s restriction of objective meaning to the human author? We will recall Dr. Cara’s framework of meaning as a circle. Within that circle, we may have things that are more central and others more peripheral.
At a “dot” in the center is what we might call the most immediate meaning of that text. For many conservative Evangelicals, meaning is “all dot and no circle”; all human and thus to to speak of God’s meaning is to engage in speculation.
Two statements may be particularly troubling. The biblical authors neither wrote their doctrine and law “with the later history of the Christian church in mind,” nor did they “produce those writings for the sake of their inclusion in the canon of Scripture. The canon was identified through the efforts of later generations to codify and regularize traditions of the community” [577].
Muller seems to be taking the Hirsch line on texts all the way into what Dr. Kruger calls the “criteria of canon” [Kruger, 73-87] model for defining the canon of Scripture. Caution is in order, though, as Muller’s view seems a bit more nuanced than mere evidentialism. He puts stress on the community’s authoritative reception of the proper texts [577]. Yet with meaning, what matters most is what was on the human author’s mind.
Without divorcing the New Testament exegesis of the Old, Muller nevertheless insists “that the chronological priority of the Old Testament be taken seriously as a foundation and ground-point of interpretation” [578]. However he makes it clear that this ought not turn the Old Testament into a mere “backdrop” for the New, as the gospel is an organic unity with God’s promises to Israel.
In light of these balances, it is seems difficult to imagine Muller disagreeing with the concept of full value. But there is a catch. He resists Christocentric “allegorical method” that does not recognize the “pre-Christian character” [579] of the Hebrew Scriptures. Of course if Muller were directly interacting with, say, G. K. Beale concerning the divine meaning that transcends the prophet’s understanding, then perhaps he would come closer to Beale’s position. Since he is not interacting with that exact question, it is difficult to say that he would disagree.
When we must answer to every context “on its own terms,” we have no hierarchy of contexts. Again, I am assuming that Muller does have some hierarchy of contexts. That is, I would assume that he would hold the central truths of dogmatic theology--the nature of God, of Christ, the image of God, sin, atonement, resurrection, and salvation by grace through faith--to be more like “metacontexts” that always hold over every era of history, every cultural milieu, every authorial perspective, etc.
Muller does speak of the hermeneutical circle as having parts and whole, at first glance analogous to our dot and whole.
But he so wants to speak of the intimate connection that the interpreter plays (not too unlike Pratt), that there are almost three moving pieces: the “objective roots” in the verbal meaning of the text (part), then the cultural, historical, and social context in which the document arose (whole), but then also the interpreter whose task is to ensure that a “legitimate circle” arises [647].
The first step is derived from Hirsch: determine the genre. It is at least the “entry point” to the circle. This opens up both the mind of the author and the function of the document for the interpreter. Notice however the chief difference. It is not in the third piece. It is that the whole is not the full range of divine meaning, but rather more of that river of context that comes out at the delta of authorial intent. The whole circle, in other words, is still to be found in the mind of the human author, so that when one is reaching back behind his mind for that which shaped his intent, it is still only that which he meant that is allowed to count.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Although Muller’s circle of meaning will not finally match up to the “full value” concept, it is encouraging to note that he prefers the idea of “significance” to that of “application.” The word application, he says, makes it sound as if an artificial appendage is being forced on the text. The idea of a text’s significance to any context--including new contexts--makes the Scripture more of a living Word, in the biblical sense of that. There is a way to mean that of historical texts as well, as in speaking of the relevance of some historic creed for today.
How exactly Muller does this with biblical texts without moving closer toward the idea of full value is not something that can be discovered in this particular writing. It turns out that the real “whole” he wants to uphold is that whole enterprise of theology with its fourfold breakdown of disciplines. This is where I am most sympathetic to Muller’s aims, but I do not know that I would resort to all of the means by which he accomplishes them.
(#theology #Reformed #PostReformation #dogmatics #Muller #hermeneutics)
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Michael J. Kruger. Canon Revisited. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012
Richard A. Muller, “The Study of Theology” in Moises Silva, ed., Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996
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