If God ordains all things, why is he not to blame for sin and evil entering the world?
It is demonstrably false that God is to blame. The answer as to why this is the case involves a confluence of corrections to assumptions (whether unwittingly held or not) that are behind the objection. Each of these corrections will no doubt require further explanation: (I) that no moral blame is logically coherent apart from the standard that God himself is; (II) that causation and creation are not identical; (III) that the objection does assume—under the highly ambiguous concept “author of evil”—that to cause is per se to create; and (IV) that to concede the metaphysical point of origin of evil as “mystery” is the same as to allow the contraries of I, II, and III back into the realm of logical possibilities.
In the argument below we will leave aside the fact that both we and the one raising the objection grant: namely, that God has indeed ordained all things. This is taught in passages like Isaiah 45:7, Romans 11:36, and Ephesians 1:11. With that being already granted, and each of those above corrections in mind, the following argument can be made.
(1) God never creates anything evil;
(2) God hates all sin;
(3) God created all things ex nihilo;
(4) God has the ability to withdraw his grace, by any degree, to any creature;
(5) Thus there are two ways in which God causes (or ordains): the one is efficiently, or direct creation; the other is permissively, or the withdrawal of a specific operation, such that a secondary cause is reduced in being by deprivation in that which it is already.
(6) If God withdraws such grace from a creature with a nature ex nihilo, it has no ability to be anything other than the nature that it is, ad nihilo, as follows from the law of identity (A = A).
(7) A being with free will is but one species of such a reality (Premises 5-6), and so, as grace is withdrawn, the nature of such a will will will privation of being willingly, and that entirely of its own nature.
(8) In order for God to be wrong to have ordained such a reality, in its whole or in part, there would have to be a “right” (or moral principle) that his act is falling short of. But what is sufficient to function as such a principle of right? Such a moral principle would have to be:
Real: that is, this moral object (perhaps, an alternative reality in which things are morally perfect so as to function as a standard for “the way things ought to be”) must exist.
Objective: that is, an actually right moral criterion, independent of any finite perspective.
Transcendent: that is, self-sufficient, eternal and immutable, in order to be right in its own right, at all times, in all places, and over all agents (including God).
Known: that is, those judging God for wrong must know what they mean by this alternative sufficient moral object, and be able to show what is meant by his present effects “falling short” of that.
(9) Now since nothing can be prior to the First Cause, himself eternal, immutable, and self-existent being, it follows that nothing higher or prior could be. So that the attributes sufficient for any “way things ought to be” are what we call God. Consequently, God is the only possible standard for all that ought to be.
(10) Therefore, God is within his right (and not merely able) to withdraw his grace, by any degree, from any creature.
(11) Therefore, it is false that, in ordaining all things, God is to blame for sin and evil entering the world.
Although this argument makes corrections to faulty assumptions I, II, and III, we will recall there was a fourth, namely, that to concede the metaphysical point of origin of evil as “mystery” is the same as to allow the contraries of I, II, and III back into the realm of logical possibilities.
If by saying that “We do not know evil’s origin,” we mean that the skeptic is unreasonable in asking for a “cross section” of that first evil intuition or inclination, then that ought to be granted without any embarrassment. To speculate what that “looked like” in Lucifer or in Adam and Eve would be just that: speculation. But to state point IV in a way that allows errors I, II, and III back into the room is to understate our case.
Objection 1. Even if we grant this logic, how should man be held guilty? This permissive will of God still leaves us with the effect of a human nature that cannot help but sin. Therefore, whether or not God can be blamed, neither can man, since he cannot do otherwise.
Reply to Objection 1. On the contrary—within the common grace of God, even sinful man can make all kinds of choices that issue forth in virtues or resist greater vices. What we deny is not the freedom of the will, but its ability to ascend to God's saving grace. In that sense, yes, “everyone who does sin is a slave to sin” (Jn. 8:34). And the one raising this objection must be shown that Paul had already anticipated this exact complaint: “You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?’ But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, ‘Why have you made me like this?’” (Rom. 9:19-20).
And after all, what exactly do we mean by moral blame anyway? Does it not to mean to recognize and charge someone with having done wrong? But what exactly does that mean in the context of the moral actor that is called “man”? If I were to ask you what is so wrong with x—and there began to substitute example after example of violations of God's law: dishonoring parents, murder, adultery, theft, false witness, and coveting—what would your answer be? At first glance, you may think that your answers will vary greatly to each of these. And in one sense that will be true. However I think you will also begin to notice some common thread to them all. This second table of the law (Commandments 5 through 10) are restricting violence against the image of God. Genesis 9:6 specifically makes this clear about the rationale against murder, and James 3:9 does the same with cursing our neighbor.
Let me come right to the point. We are to do all that we do because of what it says about God. Think of the command to be holy because God is holy in Leviticus 11:44-45 or to be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect in Matthew 5:48.
In short, God never commands human beings to be or to do on the grounds of our capacities (which is part of our nature) but on the ground of his own glory (which is the whole reason for our nature). What makes a thing good or bad at all is fundamentally God. The good because it tells the truth about him, the bad because it lies. Morality is about divine glory. It doesn't get to carve out its own independent existence. Morality is not about our ability to pull it off or know the outcomes. If we see a little girl drowning in a river, and we suddenly remember that we cannot swim, and there is no one else around to help, why should we jump in and help anyway? Is it because we are able? No, the answer is the same. It is because of what it says about God. God saves—therefore she must be saved. This whole objection is still assuming that life is about us. But that is logically impossible, given the necessity of the First Cause and consequent necessity of our being effects and thus designed for the purposes which can only be in the First Cause.
As surely as Lazarus was morally obligated to obey Jesus's command to "Come forth!"—this corpse lied about God (God is life)—so all bearers of his image are under duty to reflect God in all of the originally designed spheres of action. Man's fall into sin is no judgment against God's design, but on man's negligence. Human history is one long walk on death row. Anything that ought to be more like God and is not has reached the summit of moral blameworthiness.
Objection 2. This “efficient” versus “permissive” distinction with respect to evil’s cause is a distinction without a difference. If God has all power to do all that which is logically possible, and if the existence of any creature is strictly unnecessary (and thus its non-existence possible), then it follows that God’s “mere permission” of an evil act is tantamount to his willing it. Thus God willed all evil and thus he is still to blame.
Reply to Objection 2. This is nothing other than a reformulation of the whole logical problem of evil, applied only to the scope of the first sin. If the general problem is shown to be incoherent, then so will all of its species, as microcosms of the same unsound and invalid steps. But the whole is incoherent, as the coexistence of (i) divine omnipotence; (ii) divine omniscience; (iii) divine omnibenevolence; and (iv) evil in the world, cannot be demonstrated to contradict: which is the whole burden of such a proof.
Consider, if it is logically impossible that good and evil could co-exist at all in any sense, then either good or evil would not exist. But if evil does not exist at all, then there is no problem of evil; and if good does not exist, then there is no standard by which to call something “evil,” so that “evil” once again falls. Consequently, the thesis that good and evil cannot co-exist per se is logically incoherent. Surely this cannot be what the “logical problem” means.
What then does it mean? Those philosophers who have recognized that the basic logical problem of evil is the skeptic’s problem (not the Christian’s) must turn to speculation. For example, “If a God of those attributes exists, then he would eliminate evil in X unit of time, kind, or degree.” In reality this is only moving things off a few paces so that we do not so quickly remember the logic problem. If it is impossible to say that good and evil cannot coexist without running into an instant contradiction, then the same contradiction does not suddenly go away because we have made it “less instant.” If a thing is impossible at any instant, then it is impossible in every instance.
If we want to switch things up and pose the question, “Very well, then what morally sufficient reason would God have for ordaining X instance (whether frequency, scope, intensity, or senselessness of suffering) of evil? What greater good could possibly come out of X?” The first thing to notice is that the objection has left the problem of evil proper at this point and has moved over to the challenge of theodicy. Most people engaged in these conversations do not realize that, which only serves to confuse the matter indefinitely.
But notice that when the skeptic moves on to what is properly the realm of theodicy, or even to the so-called “evidential problem of evil,” he really has not vacated the building of that logical problem of evil. He is still holding out hope in his premises. He is still assuming (and he will continue to do so until Christians become more competent to call him on it) that it is contradictory in some way for good and evil to co-exist.
In the more evidential problem that hones in on the most heart-wrenching instances of senseless suffering, note that the upshot is still, “What reason would God possibly have to justify this?” That really is a deep and disturbing question. We should not minimize the heart of it. But it is still a question and not a demonstration. It is a genuine question if it is really asked. However, in this case it is not. And one is not heartless to recognize that. It is still the same claim to a logical problem of evil using the same dirty tactics that dictators do when using poor civilians as human shields.
What reason indeed. Note what we would need to know in order to know the reason—and this will be the case whether we judge that the reasons are sufficient or whether we judge that they fall short. We will need to know (1) the whole set of all reasons which could be used to justify all possible instances of evil, and (2) all possible outcomes of those means, and then of course (3) all actual outcomes which such a Being under investigation indeed values. Finally there is that other necessary condition already covered: (4) that self-sufficient, eternal, and immutable moral criterion for the judgment of 1-3. Cutting right to the chase, that one thing we lack to make the argument float is precisely omniscience, the existence of which would be yet one more anti-climactic outcome for all of our skeptical efforts.
As several of the above premises are admittedly difficult concepts, I fully anticipate the burden of defending any number of them. So I am content to make such a defense in however many separate posts are required.
(#originofevil #problemofevil #Godtoblame #blameGod #evilworld #authorofevil #Calvinism)
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