RTS Papers / Apologetics / Summer 2016
A Dialogue Between a Christian and a Secularist
WHAT EXACTLY HAS MODERN SCIENCE “SETTLED”?
M: All this time we have been using civility and science as our two values. And we have been trying to get at the preconditions of the first. The fact is that most modern people have assumed too much about science as well.
R: I’ve been waiting for you to bring up your pseudo-science of intelligent design.
M: Maybe next time. For the moment, I would challenge the so-called record of modern science.
R: As everyone committed to the Bible must.
M: No—I mean to challenge your assumption that science and the Scriptures are at odds at all.
What has modern science actually told us? Aside from the level of macro-evolution (which the Christian will contest) what exactly has any other science shown us that contradicts the biblical worldview? Behind that question lies another: Can science “prove” or “disprove” anything?
R: You are going to make an irrelevant distinction between the deduction of math and logic versus the induction of science. Right—strictly speaking, science does not prove, but shows what is probable. On the other hand, if the scientific viewpoint is right, then this just is the only way to know what is objectively true in the universe.
M: You are still begging the question. What you call the “scientific viewpoint” is really just your own “materialist viewpoint,” and I am saying that real scientists will know the difference.
R: Evolutionary biologists are real scientists and they do not make this distinction.
M: Stephen Jay Gould was a real scientist, and in spite of his evolutionary dogmatism, he nevertheless pointed to science and religion answering equally legitimate questions in separate spheres. I do not necessarily accept his model of the two keeping to their sides, so to speak, but my only point is that to speak of a “scientific consensus” against supernatural realities is very misleading.
R: Well Dawkins was right to criticize Gould for that, and you really surprise me, citing him when it suits you.
M: All truth suits the Christian. But let me get back to those philosophical presuppositions of science. Remember that I am saying that no science can occur apart from these preconditions. It cannot justify itself. In order to show this, will you please tell me which science empirically tests the justification for science?
R: I am not sure I know what you are asking for.
M: I want you to tell me how to empirically verify the validity of the scientific method. Or how does one falsify it?
R: You are calling the falsifiability principle into question now!
M: Not at all. I want to show you its limitations. It cannot be applied to matters beyond empirical investigation. It cannot be an ultimate standard of truth.
R: And why not?
M: Because,
If all meaningful propositions had to be, in principle, falsifiable, then the falsifiability principle would have to be falsifiable. That would mean that there is a possible world in which the falsifiability principle is false. But if it is possible for the falsifiability principle to be false, then it cannot be a necessary truth. On the other hand, if it is impossible for the falsifiability principle to be false, then there is at least one meaningful proposition that is not subject to falsifiability. Do you now see that you must presuppose it?
R: Then maybe I do and maybe we must.
M: Then let me offer ten of my own preconditions for the scientific enterprise: (1) the existence of a world outside of any of our minds, (2) that this world is orderly, (3) that this world is knowable, (4) that truth is objective, (5) that the laws of logic are objective, (6) that our minds and senses are basically reliable, (7) that language is adequate to describe that world, (8) that moral values are objective (e. g. honesty in research), (9) that nature is generally uniform and induction generally reliable, and (10) that mathematical entities are objective.
R: And you are going to tell me that a skeptic like myself cannot believe in any of these things?
M: On a spectrum, yes. Now I’m sure you would affirm every one of these so long as you can subject them in turn to the definitions of secularism. You would especially object to my claim that the laws of logic and mathematical entities are objective in the sense of being immutable and immaterial. But otherwise I have no doubt that you think you do affirm each of these.
R: But clearly you do not think I do.
M: I would like to show you that you absolutely cannot. All of these are either strictly metaphysical realities, or else physical realities that depend for their intelligibility on those higher metaphysical realities. If you do not accept that, at least go back and review one of your favorite skeptics, Hume, on the problem with supposing that inductive reasoning can give us direct knowledge of the powers behind causality.
CONCLUDING RESPONSES
R: Speaking of presuppositions, it sounds as if your religious truth is really something like the “noble lie” of many of the Greek and Romans who disbelieved in the gods and yet defended the pantheon because it was good for society.
M: Far from it.
Just because I am arguing that Christianity is the only solid foundation for science and ethics, this does not reduce Christian truth to that practical condition. A true worldview must be livable, but it must be more than that. We could easily see that the Christian worldview alone can demonstrate itself positively and account for all the evidence. But at the moment all we were doing here was answering the question “Which is better for the world?” Christianity can answer that. Atheism cannot. Agnosticism can hardly try. So if your secular viewpoint abandons atheism, I do not see how an agnostic starting point will fare any better.
R: I do not need to identify myself as an agnostic or atheist. You seem to think that atheism is just as dogmatic — indeed, just as “religious” — as your Christian theism. But any good form of unbelief is equally agnostic. If it is rooted in science, then one is open to falsification. On the other hand, your dogma is never open to criticism. And that is what separates my epistemology from yours. You don’t have one. A belief not open to scrutiny never really justifies its ground.
M: If by “open to justification” you mean going around pretending that my view does not have ultimate commitments then I will have to plead guilty to being “closed.” Actually to be aware that we all have ultimate commitments, and to focus the dialogue at that level, is the only honest way to be truly open to where the conversation most hinges. You speak about “openness” as if it were self-evident, as if the “open society” and the “open mind” were things that don’t need scrutiny themselves. But doesn’t that close the debate to what you call open? Do you have any square-circles or married-bachelors in that closed-open?
R: You are always very humorous, but I think we’ll have to wrap it up for today. Neither one of us will ever persuade the other.
(#apologetics #Christianity #secularist #humanist #atheism #agnostic #pluralism)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, James N., “Science and Scripture” (RTS Canvas Audio)
Dawkins, Richard, The God Delusion, New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin, 2006
Frame, John, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1987
Hitchens, Christopher, God is Not Great, New York, NY: Twelve-Hachette Book Group, 2007
Keller, Timothy, The Reason for God, New York, NY: Riverhead Books, 2008
Stark, Rodney, For the Glory of God, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003
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